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Form and Content in Gorgias' Helen and Palamedes: 
Rhetoric, Philosophy, Inconsistency and Invalid Argument in some Greek Thinkers 
Gorgias' Helen (B 11) and Palamedes (B 11a)1 are among the longest pieces 
of continuous prose included in Diels-Kranz, Fragmente der Vorsokratiker. We 
have here a �are opportunity of considering how a writer who merits inclusion 
in Diels-Kranz develops an argument over a number of pages. Gorgias, it is 
true·, is a rhetorician; and though he has some claim to be regarded as a soph­
ist or-Presocratic :philosopher also (see especially BJ), rhetoric2 has evident­
ly much to contribute to the Helen and Palamedes. The extent of the contri­
bution is indeed the primary subject of the first part of my paper. I shall 
inquire whether Gorgias in the Helen indulges in rhetorical flourishes in which 
form takes precedence over content; whether on" the other hand Gorgias' general 
philosophical position supplies the content of this work and furnishes premisses 
from which conclusions axe drawn for Helen's benefit, the rhetoric furnishing 
no more than a pleasing mode of presentation; or whether a case is being argued, 
and language manipulated, ad hoc, the rhetoric substituting for logic a.�d valid 
argument. Gorgias himself terms the Helen a Eaignion (21): I shall briefly con­
sider the meaning of the word in the light of my discussion. I shall discuss 
the Palamedes in less detail, and consider whether the presuppositions of the 
.Helen and Palamec.es are inconsistent with one another. Subsequently, I shall 
raise the q.uestion whether inconsistency is per � a mark of a rhetorician at 
this period, or whether similar inconsistencies may be found in other writers 
'who are philosophically more respectable. I shall also consider to· what extent 
Gorgias' presuppositions, and inconsistencies, are shared with non--philosophical 
Greeks in early Greece; and very bri�fl.y indicate some long-standing worries · 
of my own about the study o:f Presocratic philosophers. 
There is much of interest in the introduction to the Helen; but I have no 
space to discuss it here, and shall begin at (6), where Gorgias sets out four 
possible reasons or causes for Helen's going to Troy with Paris: she did what 
she did either (a) as a result of the wishes of Chance or the plans of the gods 
or the decrees of Necessity or (b) because she was carried off by force or (c) 
because she was persuaded by words (logoi) o·r ( d) because she was smitten with 
love. We might perhaps provisionally grant that Gorgias had furnished a full 
list of possible reasons or causes (but see below),J and e..<pect him to demon­
strate that Helen was influenced by (b), or possibly (a), since (b) is certain­
ly, and (a) possibly, a valid defence. Gorgias, howev,er, undertakes to show 
that, no matter which of the four was the reason, Helen should be exonerated 
from blame. He offers four argmnents or groups of arguments, one for each 
reason or cause. 
Argtunent 1. Suppose Chance, Necessity or the gods desired, planned or 
decre�Helen's journey. By nature (pephuke) the stronger (kreisson) is not 
prevented by the weaker. No; the weaker is ruled and led (sg;esthai) by the 
stronger. God (a term which evidently includes Chance and Necessity) is kreisson 
than a human being in might, wisdom, and their other characteristics. If then 
one should ascribe the causation (or the guilt, aitia) to Chance and God, one 
should absolve Helen from her bad reputation. 
I shall discuss later whether these pleas are novel.4 For the moment I 
note that the argument seems to rest primarily on causality, with the will of 
the divine powers mentioned acting as a cause. The stronger can compel the 
actions of the weaker. The argument is logically presented: its acceptability 
is likely to vary from culture to culture. However, not only logic is employed, 
nor is causality alone invoked. Kreisson does not simply mean 'stronger': it 
serves as one of the comparatiyes of �athos, 'good', so that one may be kreisson 
also in wisdom or cleverness, (sophia and other characteristics. The wiser or 
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persuaded her (or her psuche). The rest of (8) elaoorates. Now. in (9-11) logo s 
does not stand as the subject of a transit ive verb; and when it does so again in 
(12) Gorgias feels himself able to interpret 'persuaded ' as 'compelled.' The 
word-order and syntax of the sentence translated above are a step on the way. 
Logoi are the agency of persuasion; but they appear merely in a prepositio nal 
phrase. To perceive the logoi is essent ial ; but there is no word for perception. 
'Other people's pragmata and bodies' is closely paral lel ed with 'its own pathema', 
as if the pragmata and bo dies directly caused the pathema.7 The causality of 
logos is the theme of Gorgias' paragraph; but he is moving caut iously , step by 
step, to the point where he feels able to assert it; and initially that a pragma 
should cause a pathema, in the relevant sense of pathema ( which I shall discuss 
in a moment) seems prima facie more likel y -- without argument; and none is forth­
coming -- than that a logos should. (I shall argue that there is a similar device 
in (12).) · 
Rhetorical sleight of hand is most apparent he re; but is philosophy also 
present? Is Gorgias, by using paschein in (7) of physical suffering, here of 8 
the psuche, giving 'to this subjective emotion an objective, physical reality?' 
I have no doubt that Gorgias did not clearly distinguish the material from the 
non-material: I suspect Pl ato to have been the first to do so. That being so, 
the objective physical reality is likely to have been assumed unchallenged. What 
is more important for G orgias ' case is to represent the events as a causal. · sequenc·e. 
For this purpose he employs the range of usage of riaschein, pathema. Paschein may 
mean simply 'happen to, ' as when used of the Nile in Hdt. 2. 20; and at least in 
slightly later Greek nathema may mean 'emotion, affection ' when used with psuche 
(Xen. Cyr. 3 .1.17) or even of the experience of the nsuche in exercising 12hronesis 
(Plato Phd. 79d), which is not an emotion and not passive . In the Plato and Xenopho n 
cited, pathema makes no philosophical point; but of course Gorgias chooses paschein 
and pathema for the passivity implied. But the argument seems to me to be based 
not on a coherent philosophical position but on a rheto rical transference of paschein 
from one context to another. I shall argue in favor of my view by pointing out that 
such transferences are characteristic of the design of the H elen . 
Gorgias then ( 10) turns to another type of logos. Inspired ( entheoi) inc an ta­
tions through the medium of· logoi induce pleasure, banish pain; for the power 
( dunamis, cf. dunastes and dunatai ) of the incantation consorting with the opinion 
of the mind (ps uche) charms ( thelgein) it, persuades ( 'Peithein) it and changes 
(methistanai) it by witchcraft. Once again the presence of deity is alluded to 
(entheoi , 'with gods in them': cf. Argument 1), and power is set in the foreground. 
But is the 'for' clause a philosophical explanation of what precedes? S urely not, 
in the sense of an explanation drawing on a coherent theory: 'the dunamis of the 
incantation consorting • • • • can really be read only as a metaphor. It explains 
nothing; but it does make 'power' the subject of the three transitive verbs. This 
is a stro nger expression than· uathema • • . e'Pathm in ( 9). What Gorgias really offers 
is a verbal 'slide, ' in which one word is replaced by an alleged synonym which 
in fact has different implications. Thelgein, 'charm,' is the appropriate term 
. with incantations and other magic acts. It has associations of binding with spells 
against the will: Circe in Odyssey 10 ( 291, 318, J26) could have t helge_i,g Odysseus 
with her magic arts and turned him into an animal had he not had a protective herb. 
G orgias then writes peithein, implying -- without proof -- that thelgein, when 
used to instil pleasure and banish pain, is persuasion. He evidently hopes that 
' persuasion ' will be endowed with all the associations of thelgein , though the 
examples of thelgein given are solely of imparting pleasure and removing pain. 
Gorgias needs to show that persuasion not merely can impart emotions will y.;.. nill y, . 
but that the emotions will issue in action willy-nilly; .and he has really demon­
strated neither, even for thelgein and certainly not for peithein . Gorgias then 
uses methistanai, 'change.' In a weak sense of 'change' the move is harmless, since 
presumably all data, if they are to be perceived by the mind, must produce some 
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changes therein; but Gorgias needs a strong sense of 'change' -- 'producing nec­
essary changes in the psuche which necessarily issue in act�on.' He has offered 
no proof that such a sense of 'change' is appropriate; he has merely contrived 
by skilful use of language to suggest that it is. Once again we have a trico+on, 
thelgein 
• • •  neithein •• • methi stanai : a rhetorical device frequently resorted to 
for emphasis, rhetorical fullness or other stylistic reasons. Its stylistic 
function might well help to conceal that it is here used also for sleight of hand 
in the content of the argument. 
In (11) Gorgias makes the point that if everyone had knowledge of past, pre­
sent and future, the effect of logos would not be the same. But as it is, most 
people in most circumstances have to resort to opinion as counsellor. 'And opin­
ion, which is hazardous and unreliable, involves those who employ it in successes 
which are hazardous and unreliable.' Is there here allusion to a doctrine, like 
the Socratic, that no-one goes against knowled.ge? It seems not. Gorgias is making 
the common-sense point that if all the facts, including the future, were known, 
people would act differently: presumably Helen would have acted differently had 
she known the outcome of the Trojan War. The argument is a digression, and it 
does not help Gorgias' case. Not all opinions result from persuasion; to 'make 
a mistake' which is a moral error is not normally regarded as excusable in Greek; 
and Gorgias offers no reasons for a different evaluation. Furthermore, (11) im­
plies that there are actions which are not the effects of external causes; which 
reveals other flaws in the alleged comprehensiveness of his defense. I shall 
return to this point later.9 
The opening words of (12), which are hopelessly corrupt, might have contain­
ed some attempt to show the relevance of (11); but none of the proposed emenda­
tions has this effect, or even uses the term 'opinion.' Gorgias returns to the 
argument of (10), according to the emendations, at the beginning of (12); and 
visibly does so in the transmitted text at the end of (12): 'for logos which -per­
suaded her -osuche cr)m:pelled (anankazein) the -psuche whfoh it persuaded to agree 
with (peithesthai ) what was said and to acquiesce in what was done. The one who 
persuaded committed an injustice in using compulsion, whereas the one who was 
persuaded, inasmuch as she was compelled by logos, is wrongly blamed.' Gorgias 
now finds himself able to say that logos persuaded the psuche and to slide immedi­
ately to 'compelled.' The form of words is more explicit than in (9): Gorgias 
advances one step at a time. Gorgias' hearers may find it easier to accept that 
logos compelled Helen's psuche than that logos compelled Helen, since both logos 
and psuche are 'psychic'; though he has of course justified neither. He now uses 
the fact that logos is masculine, psuche feminine. He writes ho � � neisas, 
'the one who persuaded,' which might refer either to Paris or to the logos, while 
he peistheisa, 'the one who was persuaded,' might refer either to Helen or to her 
psuche. Since it is not Helen's psuche, but Helen, that is being blamed, the 
hearer is likely to interpret the seco nd participle as referring to Helen, the 
first to Paris, with the result that it is suggested that Helen was compelled by 
Paris using logos as an instrument: a proposition nrima facie even less easy to 
accept than that her psuche was compelled by logos. There is verbal dexterity 
also in peithesthai. Since it is the passive of neithein, if A peithei B, B 
peithetai; but the range of usage of peithesthai with the dative spans 'be 
persuaded, obey, trust in': the word may suggest that logos compelled Helen not 
merely to be persuaded but to trust in and obey what was said. Once again, I 
see skilful rhetoric here, but little philosophical theory. 
In (13) Gorgias speaks of persuasion added to logos 'moulding (tunousthai) 
the mind as it wishes': the strongest statement yet, and one totally unproved as 
yet. He adduces as evidence here the arguments of the cosmologists which can 
take away one opinion and implant (energazesthai) another ; forensic arguments,10 
in which one argument delights and persuades a crowd not because its statements 
are true but because it is composed with skill; and philosophical debates, in 
which quickness of wit can be seen readily making (poiein) opinion easily changed 
-5-
( eumetabolon}. I. see no philosophical theory here ; and the evidence falls far 
short of proving Gorgias' point. He adduces examples of persuasion: he needs to 
argue that all instances of persuasion are instances of necessary, compulsory 
persuasion, that 'you were persuaded by that argument, but you need not have been/ 
the argument is not persuasive' is nonsense. (cf. Aristotle's remarks in EN 1110 a 
29, which are relevant to Arguments 3 and 4 of the Helen.) There is less rhetori­
cal skill here: energazesthai (also in (8)) and noiein do not compare with some 
earlier rhetorical effects. Possibly, however, the statement that the cosmologists 
'
cause (12oiein) what is incredible and obscure to a:ppear before the eyes of doxa' 
points forward to the fourth argument. 'The eyes of doxa' is a much more unusual 
expression in Greek than is ' the mind's eye' in English, and presumably was chosen 
with some purpose. In the light of the fourth argument Gorgias could have elabor­
ated the phrase into an assertion that speech presents to the mind images over which 
we have no more control than over the manner in which what we see presents itself 
to us. There is no more than a hint here, but it may prepare for {15 ff.). As we 
have seen, Gorgias is advancing step by step. 
In (14) an analogy is drawn between the effects of logos and those of pharmaka, 
'drugs.'· Different pharmaka drive out different humors from the body: some cure, some 
kill. Similarly, some logoi cause grief, some joy, some fear, some boldness, while 
others ' through some harmful persuasion "drug" ( l)h_armakeuein) and bewit ,�h (goeteuein) 
the mind.' Once again, Gorgias is trying to equate peithein with a causal sequence, 
for the effect of a drug does not depend on the patient's choice: cure or death 
follows irrespective of the patient's wish. Is there a philosophical theory here? 
I see none. Gorgias draws an analogy between the effects of logoi on the 'PSUche 
and drugs on the body, and in justification simply says 'for drugs have effects 
.a, b1 c etc ., while logoi have effects k, 1, m, etc.' . No proof is offered that 
the effects are produced in any analogous way: this is a mere petitio ')Jrincipii. 
Any conviction must be produced by rhetoric, by skilled choice of words. Gorgias' 
word-order in discussing the effects of logos may be intended to help his case . The 
first two examples, grief and joy, do not suggest specific types of action; the 
second pair, however, fear and boldness, dispose the mind towards types of action: 
retreat and advance. (Gorgias has not attempted to prove that the· emotions cause 
the relevant actions. He might have used the arguments of 15 ff.: once again he 
may be advancing step by step.) He concludes with the exarrrple of persuasion ( aft er 
using pleasure and pain as earlier examples, as in 10), and reintroduces a word from 
(10), 'bewitched,' where he h(),s already argued for a causal sequence. The use of 
pharmakeuein together with 'bewitched' is rhetorically skilful. The word takes up 
;pharmaka earlier in (1.4). Now :E_harmaka may denote both what we should distinguish 
as medicinal drugs and magical means of affecting others.11 (Being unaware how 
either worked, the Greeks did not distinguish clearly at this period between natural 
and supernatural causation.) Pharmaka in (14), closely associated with 'humors' 
(chumos), a scientific terrn,12 predominantly suggests scientific medicine; but 
pharmakeuein, which has the same range as J2!!armaka, when brought into association 
with both go et euein and the earlier use of J2harmaka, readily calls to mind the full 
range of usage, and binds together the argument of ( 14) with that of ( 10) , where, 
Gorgias hopes, a causal sequence has already been conceded. The rhetoric is skil­
ful; of philosophical theory, or of valid philosophical argument, there is none. 
We may note once again the use of a term (goeteuein) to cross-refer to an earlier 
part of the speech in order to suggest the existence of an argument: it seems to 
be a Gorgianic device. Gorgias sums up his third argument by claiming to have 
proved that if Helen was persuaded by logos, she did not do wrong but was tmfortun-
ate (atuchein). She was not the agent but the patient. . . 
Argument 4. The fourth argument, designed to exonerate Helen if it was love 
that 'did' all this, takes a similar line. (Note the immediate ascription of agency, 
prattein, to love: Gorgias' confidence is increasing.) What we see does not have. 
the nature we wish it to have, but whatever it chances to ha�e ; and through sight 
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plicitly discussed, but possibly hinted at in Argument J, (11); it came by the 
snares of Chance, (Argument 1), not the plans of the mind and by the necessities 
of love, not the devices of art. 'Necessities' once again introduces the idea 
of compulsion by a stronger. 
Is there philosophy here? What is said about sight is evidently comnatible 
with the view ascribed to Gorgias by Plato (Meno 76 A ff.) that color is an 
effluence from objects, fitting the passages(:)f"the eyes, since it assert s a flow 
from obj ects . into the perceiver; but the argument of (1.5)ff. rests on observable 
h'l.Illlan behavior, would be compatible with many theories of perception, and woulcl 
be rendered no more valid by any theory that stopped short, as Gorgias' does, of 
claiming more than that certain results 'of'ten' follow. There is curious Greek· 
here: it seems strange to say that ' sight is throvm into confusion and confuses,' 
that it 'engraves images in the mind' and that Helen's eye was pleased and then 
caused effects in her psuche. There may be a philosophical theory; but it is 
worth observing that similar phrases occur in tragedy . Opsis, here translated 
' sight , ' is a word whose range spans ' sight , appearance, face, eyes. ' The connota­
tion of the word perhaps renders it easier to write that opsis is thrown into con­
fusion, disturbed, by terror. Similarly , Ele:ctra says to Orestes that his � · 
('eye, face , etc.' ) is thrown into confusion ( tarattein ) , when Orestes' experiences 
have driven him mad (Eur. Orest. 253). Hades in Aesch. Eum. 27.5 is said to watch 
over everything �c.\.r'-'lf"q'"'i' 4·(-'i:i.1{ :J 'with.a mind that records on tablets.• A;;::nn, 
the Guard in Soph. Ant. 317 asks 'Are you pained in your ears or in your �uche?' 
The idea is used somewhat differently; but the distinction drawn between effects . 
in ears and psuche is comprehensible in the absence of any philosophi cal theory,13 
(The date of Antigone makes it impossible to suppose the line affected by Gorgias' 
famous visit to Athens. ) There might be a philosophical theory here nonetheless; 
after all, metaphor is sometimes a source for philsophical theory, and I shall argui 
below that there are precedents for some of Gorgias' causal expressions in earlier 
Greek . It remains true, however, that the theory does not materially assist the 
argument , which rests sha!dly on empirical observation -- extrapolated -- and 
rhetorical sleight of hand. 
It is worth noting that Gorgias ' four arguments do not exclude all possibility 
of condemning Helen. In 11 the possibillty of. moral error arising out of mistake 
about one's best i.nterests was mentioned, though not ·very cl early; and now in 19 
we have mention of 'the plans of intellect' and 'the devices of art' as possible 
sources of action which are not relevant to Helen's case. (Gorgias does not ex­
plain why they are not relevant ; and this is of course a serious flaw in his argu­
ment. ) 
If my analysis is correct, Gorgias is throughout manipulating language with 
great rhetorical skill to prove a case ad hoc. He is not setting out a philosophi­
cal theory held on other grounds, and drawing from it conclusions which serve to 
acquit Helen . (Nor is he indulging in rhetorical flourishes for the:i.r own sake: 
language is manipulated in a very purposeful manner . ) Gorgias' concern is to acquit 
Helen, and he draws on all his resources of ingenuity to construct a case for so 
doing. In (8) ff. and (15) ff. he begins from empirical observation , drawing from 
it conclusions which go far beyond what is justified, but demand no coherent theory, 
and invoke none. The motive power of the argument s  is verbal dexterity sustained 
over the whole work: I have noted the manner in which Gorgias uses words and phrases 
to allude and cross-refer from one argument to another in order to support one point 
-- not by argument, but by verbal association -- with a point he claims to have 
proved, or is going to 'prove' later. ( Note how he carefully sets the two less 
controversial defences first, and reverses the order (20) when all are 'proved,' 
so that the more difficult proofs may be thrust into the foreground. ) The argu-
. ments of the Helen can be understood without reference to a philosophical theory. 
That they would be val id only if a particular type of ph ilosophical theory were 
held does not prove that Gorgia� held such a theory. The structure and method of 
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able person playing no role whatever. On the basis of the arguments of the Helen 
one could draw from the fact that the army did not run away qn a par ticular occasion 
the conclusion that the visual (or in different ci rc umstances, verbal or aural gener­
ally) stimulu s was insufficient to cause fl igh t , and one might add ' to an army of 
persons so discipl ined and with such a characte r ; ' but one could only argue thus 
after the event, for one could not forecast the effects of a visual/aural presenta­
tion which in all its ind iv id ual details could never have occurred before. Accord­
ingly, the arguments of Hele n (16) would rende r it impossible for Palamedes to arg ue , 
as he does, 'because I have such and s uch a character, I did not behave in such and 
such a manner. ' If the arguments of the Hel en are pressed as Gorgias needs to press 
them to a chieve the goal of his reasoning in that s pee ch, the position of the Helen 
is seen to be incompatible with that of the Palamedes. 
We may be tempted to conclude that s uch d is crepan cies are a mark of the paignion, 
interpreted as a work la ckin g in seriousness : Gorgias, we may s uppose, simpl y makes 
whatev�r assu mpt ion s he needs for the argument in hand. The meani ng of paignion has 
been much discussed: it has been comp ared with lu sus in Catullus and pa ign ia in 
Philetas, to indicate that work s  so termed may have been serio usly and carefully 
composed. 1 5 There is of course a difference between poetry and phi losophi cal argu­
ment: one m ight work long and seriously at a poem on a frivolous topi c and produce 
an excellent poem; but se rious work on the prod uct io n of clever but invalid argu­
ments will be differ�iltly evaluated. Gorgias' seriousness about his skill as a 
rhetoricia n cannot be doubted ; but, as indeed contin ui ng schola rl y debate on the 
subject would sugges t, I doubt whether it can be conclusively demonstrated whe ther 
or not Gorgias believed his arguments in the Helen to be valid. He may have done so, 
for these are the early days of logic and philosophy ; or if he knew that there was 
something wrong with the arguments, he ma y not have known what it was. He is ce rt ain ­
ly not the onl y Presocratic to arg ue for ext reme conclusions.16 What can be demon­
s trated , however, is that similar discrepanc ies occur, in different kinds of work in 
which there is no quas tion of deliberate rhetorical trickery; and to this I now turn 
my attent ion . 
For even if the Helen and Palamedes are rhetorical and contain di s crepanci es, 
it does not necessarily foll ow that their bei ng rhetorical is a sufficient explana­
tion for the discrepancies. A rh etori ci an cannot take any presuppositions he choose s : 
they m ust ap pear plausible to those whom he is trying to convince. Now though his 
arguments about logos and visual data may be novel, Gorgias was not the first Greek 
to tra ce action back to causes outside the agent. Action is frequently so character­
ized in Homer; and similar l ang uage appears in fifth- centu ry writers. In a famous and 
much - d i scuss ed passage, Iliad 19.85 ff.,17 Ag amemnon, having discovered the disastrous 
effects of offending Achilles, says: 'Often indeed did the Greeks tell me this, and 
abused me. But I am not aitios of this. No; Ze us and moira and th e Fury who walks 
in garkne ss are the cause; for t hey put fierce blindness, ate, i nto my min d in the 
assembly when I myseif dep rived Achilles o f h is p ri ze. But what could I do? The 
god brings all th ing s to pass.' Agai n , one may yi eld to one's thumos; in _!_liad 9.109 
Agamemnon ' s behavior in slighting Achilles is thus ex plained. l{ere -- and numero us 
examples could be cited -- we have ascri ptio ns of cause very similar to those of 
Gorg ias ' Helen; and Agamemnon ev�n says that he is not aiti os. If Go rgia s ' Helen 
can be so cha rac te rized, she is f ree d from blame (6). Occasionally, similar moves 
are ma de in Homer. In Iliad 3.164 f., Priam ex cuses Helen from responsibility for 
the war, saying 'You are not aitie; in my eyes the god s are aitioi, who have stirred 
up against me the woeful wa r with the Greek s . ' But this attitude to divine causa­
tion is unusual, in Homer and later. Indee d , Ze us' com plaint, Od ys sey 1.32 ff. 
(which is not really required by the s ituation i n the poem at th is point) , that the 
accusations me n bring against the gods are unjustified since ma nkind b ring woes 
upon themselves . huter m oro n, seems �es�gned as a r�� ec� ion of the �ind of vie':' expressed by Pri&�; 8 and set where it is at the beg inning of the first book, it i s 
given great prominence and see ms progra mmatic . In Ilia d 19, Agamemnon does not 
expect to be excused for what he has done: he offers re compense to Achille s, and 
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indeed follows his statement that three deiti�s were aitioi with 'I myself (autos) 
deprived Achilles . • • ' Autos is very emphatic, and expresses Agamemnon's agency 
very strongly. 
In the fifth century it remains unusual to excuse behavior on the grounds that 
it was .caused by deity. There are two recorded instances of Delphi excusing human 
agents for actions which, the oracle reveals, the gods have caused themselves (the 
priestess Timo and Evenius, Hdt. 6.135 and 9.93); but the conclusion that, if a 
god caused the action, the human being is not responsible for it, is not usually 
drawn. Aeschylus in Agam. 1468 ff. displays a sensitivity· to problems of divine 
causation and human responsibility which is not apparent in his earlier plays.19 
In the Agamemnon the chorus speaks of the daimon that has fallen on the accursed 
house. The form of expression is common enough; but Clytemnestra unusually tries 
to employ it to disclaim responsibility. Later the chorus speaks of Agamemnon as 
'srnitten • . .  by a two-edged weapon wielded by the hand of a wife.' Clytemnestra 
realises that such language ascribes responsibility to her as agent. She denies 
responsibility, claiming that the Alaster, the avenging spirit of the accursed 
house, took her shape and killed Agamemnon. The chorus rejects the defence: 'Who 
will bear witness that you are anaitios of this murder? Yet the avenging spirit 
sprung from a father's crime might be a sharer in the deed.' 
Even in the extreme case of the accursed house of Greek tragedy, th� accursed 
may not appeal to the language of divine causation in order to plead that they are 
not to be held responsible for their actions. The Alastor may be a contributory 
cause; but, to quote what I have written elsewhere, 'while some may be predisposed 
to do evil by supernatural agency, none are so predestined.' Clytemnestra had a 
choice. 
The gods caused Agamemnon to slight Achilles by sending ate upon him (Iliad 
9.115 f., 19.136 f., etc.); and ate is frequently cited in later Greek as influenc­
ing action for the worse. Usually, the ascription to ate furnishes no excuse; and 
Dodds seems to be correct in·supposing that it serves primarily to distance the 
agent psychologically from the act.20 Agamemnon feels that had not 'something' 
prevented it, he would have acted sensibly, with a proper calculation of advantages. 
Clytemnestra, in a psychological revulsion from what she has done for the scene 
is psychologically sound; it is not merely a philosophical debate -- feels that 
she would not 'herself' have done what has been done. 
In earlier Greek, accordingly, it was not uncommon to ascribe the source of 
actions, particularly -- but not solely -- actions whose consequences had been, or 
might be, disastrous, to causes outside the agent, or external to the agent's 
ego, usually identified with the practical intelligence. That the agent would other­
wise have behaved 'sensibly' is a tacit assumption of this belief: there is no implied 
general determinism of action. Now Gorgias' Palamedes is denying that he has done 
anything wrong; he claims to have acted with the prudence and common sense that would 
ensure that he would not commit. treachery in the circumstances. Helen has pe�formed, 
or been involved in, an important action with disastrous consequences; and Gorgias 
has furnished her with a choice .of chains of causation beginning outside the agent. 
In this respect the difference between the analysis of Helen's situation and that 
of Palamedes is traditional. 
I have noted that even in the Helen it is conceded -- or seems to be conceded; 
but see below -- that not all actions are externally caused, that there is no asser­
tion of a universal determinism of action; and this too i.s traditional. Gorgias 
departs from the mainstream of Greek tradition partly by the rhetorical ingenuity 
with which he argues for and elaborates his causal chains , but more importantly by 
his insistence that the causal chains furnish grounds for exonerating Helen from 
blame. It is at this point that the contradictions between the Helen and the 
Palamedes become apparent. So long as the causal explanation furnished psychologi-
. cal relief, but not an excuse, it was not important to determine criteria for the 
class of actions to which the causal explanation was relev·ant: as we have seen, 
.. .  
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Agamemnon in the Iliad can cite three deities-as external causes, and say emphati­
cally that he himself did the deed, all within the space of a few lines. In these 
circumstances it is comparatively unimportant whether or not the causal explana ­
tion is invoked in any particular case. Gorgias, however, in the Helen has furnish­
ed causal explanations which are intended to excuse , and which could be applied, so 
far as I can see, to any misdeed whatever. Gorgias may allude to miscalculations 
of interest, to the plans of intellect and the devices of art; but one can always 
say of any action 'I did this because ... '; and if the agent wished to obtain or 
avoid something (as presumably he did) then at least Argument 4 will be available 
to excuse him. Furthermore, good actions have motives too: Argument 4 could furnish 
a causal explanation for all actions which do not fall under Arguments 1, 2 or 3. 
A universal determinism of action could easily be 'generated from what is said in 
the Helen; and such a determinism is not consistent with the Palamedes. 
Gorgias may have failed to realise all the implications of his arguments in 
the Helen: he is arguing a case for one important action of one important person, 
and does not overtly generalise his findings. He does not say explicitly -- and 
it would have been shocking to Greek sentiment -- that armies which run away are 
not to be held responsible for their, actions. Further, since Paris was presumably 
under the influence of eros in his behavior towards Helen he should, under the terms 
of Argument 4, be absolved from blame; but Gorgias does not wish to draw this con­
clusion (7, 12). 
I conclude that Gorgias' Helen and Palamedes owe much more to rhetoric than 
to philosophy , but also that each draws on certain assumptions about behavior and 
causation which date back at least as far as Homer. Gorgias was not taking up 
different.positions in different speeches with conscious sophistry, but in each 
case elaborating positions which would have been familiar to the Greeks of his day. 
Nor is it impossible for an acknowledged philosopher to hold that wrongdoing 
is involuntary, right-doing voluntary. Aristotle _1.rgues against the position (EN 
1110b9 ff.), defining action done under compulsion as action whose first cause-.­
lies outside the agent ( ct 4 J.:ri.1 ��""fYc."1 ) . The definition seems unexception­
able; but Aristotle is aware that it might be argued that actions performed to ob­
tain what is pleasant or kalon are involuntary, since these objects are outside 
the agent and exert force to compel him (anankazein, cf. Helen _(17) with cross­
reference to (12)). Aristotle replies that such a theory renders all action in­
voluntary, since the desire for what is pleasant or kalon actuatesall men in 
all their actions; and no-one, ·Aristotle is confident, would accept any theory 
which had such consequences. (Gorgias, as I said above, seems not to have realised 
all the possible consequences of his arguments in .the Helen; and I see no reason 
to suppose that he would have welcomed them.) Aristotle adds a further point: actions 
done in pursuit of the pleasant or kalon are pleasant, and so cannot be done under 
compulsion; and be observes that it would be absurd to take the credit for noble 
actions performed in pursuit of the kalon or pleasant while disclaiming responsibi­
lity for bad actions performed for the same motives. Aristotle's own view is that 
actions done under compulsion are not simply those whose first cause lies outside 
the agent; the person compelled must have contributed nothing at all; and he holds 
that being persuaded, or moved to action by desire for the kalon or pleasant, are 
elements of action over which the agent exercises some control. Argument 2 of the 
Helen (force majeure) remains valid, as possibly does Argument 1 in some circumstances;21 
but the practical wisdom of the Palamedes is restored to Arguments 3 and 4 of the 
Helen, thereby breaking the chain of causation. 
A little later (EN 1111 a 24 ff.) Aristotle considers the internal, non-rational 
springs of action: thumos and epithumia. If actions performed under their constraint 
are involuntary, then no child or animal will ever act voluntarily. Once again, 
Aristotle is confident that no one would accept a theory with such consequences. He 
· then points out that both good and bad actions may be prompted by thumos or epithumia; 
and it would be absurd to claim credit for good actions, .but excuse oneself for bad 
., ; 
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ones, when the ascribed cause of each group of actions is the same. He concludes 
(EN 1111 b 1 ff.): 'It seems that the irrational passions are not less human than 
reason is. Accordingly, actions which result from thumos or epithumia are the man's 
actions too .... It is absurd, then, to suppose that these are involuntary.' 
The arguments, particu�arly those of 1110 b 9 ff., could have Gorgias for their 
target: they are especially relevant to Argument 4. However, Gorgias cannot be the 
sole target. More prominent thinkers than he had held that no-one is voluntarily 
kakos without.also maintaining that no-one is voluntarily agathos, notably Socrates 
and Plato.22 The Socratic position could be regarded as a more enlightened version 
of Helen (11): if we were not ignorant of our best interests in the full sense of 
. 
' 
the phrase, we should act differently. My concern here is not to discuss the Socratic 
position as such, merely to show that discrepancies of the kind found in Gorgias 11 
and lla are not confined to rhetors and sophists; and for that purpose a brief dis­
cussion of the rather different account of 'no-one is voluntarily kakos' which appears 
in the Timaeus will be suitable. Timaeus treats the basic stuff of the cosmos as 
being triangles, a shape from which may be constructed every plane figure and thence 
every solid. Earth, air, fire and water differ because they are constituted of dif­
ferent geometric shapes. God made h�man marrow from primary triangles of the high­
est quality, and bound human psuche into it. He divided the marrow between the head 
and the spinal column, the head receiving the divine seed of reason, the other parts 
of the psuche being bound into the spinal column. A psuche so bound to its body may 
be affected by it, and some of Timaeus' words (e.g. 86 B) would suggest that psuche 
is under the control of body. There exist diseases of the psuche which result.from 
the condition of the body. Madness in the familiar sense of the term is included; 
and this is uncontroversially involuntary. But the greatest diseases of the psuche 
are pleasures and pains in excess. The abundant flow of one substance', resulting 
from the open texture of the bones, is the cause of sexual excess; while bad temper, 
rashness, cowardice, forgetfulness and stupidity -- all1diseases1 of the psuche --
are ascribed to the presence of acid and salty phlegms and bitter and bilious humors, 
which wander through the body (86 E) and 'find no exit but are pent within the body 
and blend their vapor with the movement of the psuche and cause all manner of diseases 
to the psuche.' It is wrong, says Timaeus, to reproach anyone in any of these con­
ditions as if he were voluntarily bad: no-one is voluntarily kakos (86 D-E). The 
kakos is so as a result of the unskilled nurtureof his body, and the condition is 
universally detested by its possessors, and occurs against their will. 
Nowhere else in Plato do we find an explanation of human behavior in such mechan­
istic terms. One might expect to find an explanation of arete in similar terms, for 
the p�uche seems entangled in a nexus of causes over which it has no control. But 
consider the following (87 B): 'Furthermore, when men are in such an evil condition 
(kakos), and the political constitutions are kakai and speech in the cities, both in 
private and in public, is kakos, and when lessons which would cure these conditions 
are nowhere learnt from childhood, as a result of this those of us who are kakoi 
become kakoi on account of two altogether involuntary causes. We must always regard 
the parents as responsible for the situation rather than the children and the nurses 
rather than those in their care; yet each of us must endeavor, so far as in him lies, 
to flee kakia and pursue the opposite by means of his motive, practices and studies. 1· 
The Timaeus is a work of philosophy, not composed by a sophist or a rhetor. The 
speech of Timaeus is presumably to be. taken seriously, even if the account is only 
'probable' (440, etc.). Yet the speaker does not consider the possibility -- indeed, 
the necessity, in terms of the account of kakia given above -- that the bad parents 
and nurses are involuntarily bad, but is prepared to find fault with them; just as 
Gorgias does not consider that his causal explanations for Helen's behavior, partic­
ularly in Argument 4, could be used to excuse Paris too. Again, despite the far­
reaching explanation of temperaments and behavior in mechanistic terms, Plato adjures 
adults to flee kakia by their own endeavors. It may be argued that this position 
need not be self-contradictory; but it requires more defense than it receives in.the 
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